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Abstract
This paper argues for localizing the provisioning of broadband internet access within the portfolio of municipal ser-
vices with a view to achieving universal service penetration. In supporting this proposition, this paper first offers a 
critique of how the centralization of regulatory oversight at the federal level has proven problematic in meeting uni-
versal service objectives. The paper then presents a rationale and proposition for provisioning household broadband 
services in low-income urban areas through municipal social and subsidized housing undertakings, and as a partial 
redress to broadband disenfranchisement.
Keywords: universal broadband access, internet policy, internet access rights, social technology inclusion, municipal 
services
Résumé
Cet article plaide en faveur de la localisation de l’approvisionnement d’accès Internet à large bande par les services 
municipaux en vue de parvenir à un déploiement de service universel. Afin d’appuyer notre proposition, l’étude 
d’abord offre une critique de la manière dont la centralisation de la supervision réglementaire au niveau fédéral s’est 
avérée problématique pour atteindre les objectifs du service universel. Ensuite, l’on présente une proposition pour 
l’approvisionnement de services à large bande aux ménages dans les zones urbaines à faible revenu par le biais d’en-
treprises municipales de logement social et subventionné, et comme une solution partielle pour redresser la situation 
d’inégalités d’accès Internet à large bande.
Mots-clés: de l’approvisionnement d’accès Internet à large bande; déploiement de l’Interner pour service universel; 
services à large bande aux ménages dans les zones urbaines à faible revenu
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Introduction
The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s (CRTC) 2016 decision entitled Modern 
telecommunications services – The path forward for Canada’s digital economy reflects a culmination of public interest 
advocacy in the provisioning of universal internet service delivery in Canada, while simultaneously illuminating the 
tensions that have underpinned efforts to remediate broadband access barriers. At first blush, the CRTC’s 2016 de-
cision appears to represent a promising departure from the Commission’s previous efforts to advance an agenda in 
support of broadly inclusive internet access. Framing its decision to situate access to broadband internet as a basic 
service, the CRTC articulates a number of social and economic junctures in which universal internet service availa-
bility is recognized as an essential telecommunications service. Central to the CRTC’s 2016 decision is a shift in the 
Commission’s focus from telephony to broadband internet service as Canada’s key telecommunications resource, and 
a designation of both mobile and fixed broadband internet as basic telecommunication services in Canada (Canadian 
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2016; Jayakar, Maitland, Peha, Strover, and Bauer, 2016). 
Although the CRTC’s final decision was lauded for centralizing broadband access as the primary telecommuni-
cations service that will guide its future focus, and for the substantial increase in targeted service speeds to 50 Mbps, a 
critical analysis of the Commission’s 55 page decision reveals the CRTC’s reluctance to exercise its regulatory powers 
with a view to compelling telecommunications service providers (TSPs) to meet the quality, service penetration, 
and affordability targets identified in the decision. In perhaps more of a tacit admission of the limitations of its own 
powers to effect comprehensive broadband access, the CRTC makes numerous references to the roles and responsi-
bilities of ambiguously defined external stakeholders:
The Commission cannot address on its own all the gaps in the availability and adoption of broadband 
Internet access services that have been identified over the course of this proceeding. While the Act gives 
the Commission broad powers to regulate the provision of telecommunications services, other stakehol-
ders are better placed to implement solutions to address some of these gaps, as discussed later in this 
decision (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2016: 13).
The consistency with which the CRTC calls for collaborative approaches is substantial; both in defining the limits 
of its own role, as well as illuminating a potential pathway for autonomy at the local community level. It is at this 
juncture that the following discussion forwards an argument for increased municipal intercession in the delivery of 
household broadband services, to communities characterized by heightened levels of economic and social vulnera-
bility, and through municipally provisioned social and subsidized housing undertakings. Borrowing its conceptual 
grounding from Community Informatics scholarship, the purpose and rationale underscoring this proposition sug-
gests that actualizing constructive outcomes in relation to digital technology use is necessarily contingent on local 
autonomy, both in the design of community networks, as well as provisions to support the differentiated needs of 
users (Clement et al., 2004; Clement and Shade, 2000; Karanicolas, 2014). Background is presented through a criti-
cal analysis of the shortcomings of telecommunications oversight at the federal level, which suggests that incumbent 
TSPs have benefitted from a regulatory regime which has prioritized the diffusion of broadband services through the 
retail market, and where local governments wield little statutory authority in telecommunications matters.
Any critique of the apparent gaps contained within the CRTC’s 2016 decision should be framed by an unders-
tanding of the tensions between public and commercial telecommunications interests that have characterized CRTC 
activities for three decades. These include; voice and data deregulation in 1979 (Shepherd, Taylor, and Middleton, 
2014) and the removal of pricing caps in 2006 (Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006). By claiming 
that the bulk of the barriers identified in the 2016 decision exist beyond its regulatory mandate, the CRTC does litt-
le to promote confidence in its leadership role, assuage critics who have accused the Commission of absenteeism in 
curating its public interest mandate, or to support local governments who have been challenged by incumbent TSPs 
(Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2009). 
The structural and political limitations of federal oversight
From an administrative perspective, and unlike its counterparts in other jurisdictions, the CRTC operates as an inde-
pendent public organization under the purview of two federal agencies; Innovation, Science and Economic Develop-
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ment Canada (ISED), and the Heritage Minister. The superordinate relationship between the CRTC and ISED, in 
particular, have characterized telecommunications policymaking in Canada; illustrating how structural barriers have 
constrained the CRTC’s efforts to universalize broadband access, and allowed TSPs to exploit regulatory backdoors 
with a view to challenging decisions made by the commission (Mackwood, 2015).
Though exclusively centralized at the federal level, telecommunications regulation in Canada is nonetheless ten-
sioned by the relatively transparent and public activities of the CRTC on one side, and by the conspicuously opaque 
and politicized decision making of ISED (formerly Industry Canada) on the other (Rajabiun and Middleton, 2016; 
Shepherd et al., 2014). ISED’s parliamentary privilege (and indirect oversight) over the CRTC is most problemati-
cally evidenced via the cabinet appeal process, a circuitous regulatory channel which has allowed TSPs to circumvent 
the authority of the CRTC by appealing directly to ISED, and whose procedural characteristics have tended to fa-
vour submissions from the commercial sector rather than from public/consumer advocates (Shepherd, 2018). The 
cabinet appeal process constitutes a superordinate layer of telecommunications oversight that is susceptible to poli-
tical partisanship, while simultaneously lacking mechanisms for public accessibility or transparency (Rajabiun and 
McKelvey, 2019; Shepherd, 2018). Indeed, a number of decisions rendered by ISED via the cabinet appeal process 
illuminates the mediating role of political partisanship at the federal level. During the conservative era between 2006 
and 2014, ISED (then Industry Canada) went so far as to direct the Commission to limit its regulatory activities in 
pursuing universal service delivery (Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006); and adjudicated in fa-
vour of incumbent TSPs on their statutory obligations to serve (Privy Council Office, 2009b) and in limiting whole-
sale access to their networks (“Petitions to the Governor in Council concerning Telecom Decisions CRTC 2008-117 
and CRTC 2008-118,” 2009; Privy Council Office, 2009a). 
Public interest representation is central to the CRTC’s official mandate (Telecommunications Act, 1993). The 
last 30 years, however, have demonstrated a progressive re-regulatory agenda that has often been at odds with po-
litically liberalized framings of those interests; failure to action the recommendations of the National Broadband 
Task Force (2001) to de-centralize broadband deployment, and a failure to impose minimum internet service levels 
in 2011 ( Janigan, 2011; Rajabiun, 2017).The CRTC’s history of relying on market based mechanisms in servicing 
its public mandate have caused some critics to accuse the commission of absenteeism in meeting its public interest 
obligations (Bishop and Lau, 2016; Moll and Shade, 2011; Shepherd et al., 2014). While market based solutions 
have constituted the primary lattice upon which the CRTC has operated, this itself is not rationale for accusing the 
Commission of neglecting its public interest role. Some scholars have noted the consistency with which the CRTC 
has engaged in ongoing re-regulation of Canada’s telecommunications sector in order to balance public and commer-
cial interests in the pursuit of comprehensive broadband availability (Babe, 1990; Winseck, 2017). In this context, 
much of the critical response directed at the Commission tends to foreclose on the economic realities of policyma-
king (Winseck, 2017).
The fundamental problem is not that the CRTC pursues market based solutions in and of themselves, but rather 
that those approaches are contingent upon collaboration between public stakeholders and commercial TSP incu-
mbents; incumbents who have historically been resistant to public partnerships, but who instead tend to favour public 
subsidies (Mackwood, 2015; Rajabiun, 2017). While telecommunications policy on any level is subject to economic 
considerations, in Canadian telecom policy narratives those considerations tend to regarded as reconcilable only with 
the constructive participation of commercial TSPs. A problem emerges when ideals of public interest conflict with 
those commercial interests, illustrating what Tamara Shepherd (2018) described as “discursive legitimations that 
reinforce existing power differentials” (Shepherd, 2018: 242). The public submission phase that led into the CRTC’s 
2016 decision illustrates this differential, with commercial telecommunications stakeholders framing the ideal of the 
public interest as an economic, rather than a political affordance. In this case, industry submissions characterized the 
barriers to, and opportunities afforded by, universal broadband access almost exclusively in the context of Canada’s 
“digital economy” (Bell Canada and its Affiliates, 2015). Public interest advocates, for their part, tended to charac-
terize those barriers in terms of their consequences for the basic activities of disenfranchised communities; access 
to basic employment services, public transit, healthcare and education (Media Access Canada, 2016; Nenshi, 2015; 
The Affordable Access Coalition, 2015). From this footing, state regulators like the CRTC can more accurately be 
scrutinized for failing in their roles as intermediaries who stand between the public and commercial interests, and for 
failing to insulate key public interest areas from the uncertainties and tumult of the commercial telecommunications 
market. 
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As a structural limitation, the community level intersections that characterize the role of the internet in sup-
porting the day-to-day needs of Canadians presents a problem of abstraction for policy produced at the federal level. 
Simply put, federal policy is limited in its ability to reconcile those needs, both as a reflection of the degree to which 
it must normalize outcomes across broad constituencies, and in its susceptibility to politicization. Canada’s own Na-
tional Broadband Task Force (NBTF) in 2001 identified the problem of regulatory abstraction as a barrier to univer-
sal broadband provisioning in its recommendation to empower local levels of government (Rajabiun, 2017). Unlike 
some European examples, most municipal governments in Canada are not afforded significant statutory privileges in 
their negotiations with superordinate levels of government or federally regulated TSPs. Though legislative authority 
is granted to the CRTC through acts of parliament, the Commission’s efforts to test the limits of its authority have 
been regularly challenged by federal, private, and inter-governmental stakeholders (Fasken Martineau DuMoulin 
LLP, 2011; Masse and Beaudry, 2015; Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2006; M. H. Ryan, 2012).
Owing, in part, to the ambiguity of its powers embodied in the Telecommunications and Broadcasting Acts, the 
CRTC itself appears ill positioned to meaningfully address the broadband needs of local communities, nor to compel 
public-private cooperation on the part of incumbent TSPs who tend to view any form of public interlocution as an-
tithetical to their interests, and who instead rely on public oversight that limits competitive access to the service mar-
ket (Shepherd, 2018), or when seeking federal paramountcy in disputes with municipalities (Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities, 2009; M. Ryan, 2011), as antithetical to their interests. This state of affairs is tacitly acknowledged 
by the CRTC throughout its 2016 decision. The opportunity now is to tie together research and advocacy across all 
three primary levels of government in Canada with a view to developing an inter-jurisdictional broadband delivery 
framework to more effectively redress the technical, economic, educational, and literacy barriers that characterize 
Canada’s digital divide. 
A model example of universal service provisioning
The delivery and administration of universal healthcare in Canada provides a helpful model for envisioning a curato-
rial role for the federal government. In this scenario, parallels can be drawn between the indirect role played by federal 
stakeholders in enabling a constructive statutory environment, with federal oversight mostly limited to ensuring that 
the provinces, tasked with on-the-ground service delivery, adhere to the principles of the Canada Health Act (which 
provide for universality and non-excludability) (British Columbia Ministry of Health, 2012; Health Canada, 2012). 
The interjurisdictional framework upon which healthcare is delivered in Canada illuminates two characteris-
tics that are salient to envisioning a federal role in universal broadband provisioning; that diverse regional interests 
can foreclose on the ability of federal stakeholders to exercise meaningful administrative oversight; and that a more 
constructive undertaking for the federal government is to indirectly facilitate the delivery of services by enabling more 
localized levels of government. As a functional model, however, the healthcare example falls short in some key areas:
Funding
On-the-ground health services are provided by a combination of public and private practitioners, Canada’s single 
payer system is wholly public in its funding, and explicitly precludes private insurance carriers from the market of 
provisioned health services (British Columbia Ministry of Health, 2012). In the context of broadband service deli-
very, the delineation of telecommunications oversight between the CRTC and Innovation, Science and Economic 
Development Canada (ISED) (Mackwood, 2015), as well as the absence of Provincial telecommunications underta-
kings in all but one province (SaskTel), suggests that a national and publicly administered undertaking is unlikely to 
glean any meaningful political support. 
The provincial role
The provincial role is equally problematic, as unlike healthcare, telecom oversight in Canada is entirely centralized at 
the federal level. All but one of the provincial telecommunications undertakings that emerged in the mid 20th Cen-
tury have since been subsumed by Canada’s incumbent TSPs (Harper, 1999). Provincial support for the deployment 
of intermediate broadband infrastructures, as evidenced in Alberta’s SuperNet (Choma, 2018) project and the Pro-
vince of Ontario’s recently announced Up to Speed: Broadband and Cellular Action Plan (Office of the Premier, 2020), 
evidence an interventionist role for provinces in facilitating large-scale undertakings that leverage provincial rail and 
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transportation assets. Additionally, and by leveraging its existing educational resources, the role of the province could 
be focused on helping to remediate issues of digital literacy and inform constructive outcomes for users via the public 
education system.
The federal role
The delineation of regulatory oversight in healthcare delivery is as much a product of administrative necessity as it is 
a product of political idealism, with the Canada Health Act providing the statutory framework necessary to mobilize 
stakeholder activities and limit ambiguity in service provisioning. Unlike Health Canada, a federal ministry with 
direct oversight of the Canada Health Act, the CRTC lacks the parliamentary privilege that would be required to di-
rectly mobilize changes to the Telecommunications Act with a view to entrenching universality as a statutory principle. 
Municipal intervention in the provisioning of broadband services
The pursuit of universally accessible broadband, therefore, will likely require concerted and deliberate action on the 
part of municipal policymakers who are less susceptible to the partisanship associated with formal party structures at 
the Provincial and Federal level, and where the ideal of the public interest is more easily reconciled in the provisio-
ning of basic services. In this arrangement, federal regulators will be pressed to reconcile their activities against the 
public interest claims made by local governments, especially in response to any appeals made by incumbent TSPs. 
This is not uncharted territory; previous challenges to municipal oversight in telecommunications matters have seen 
both the CRTC as well as Canadian courts adjudicate in favour of incumbent TSP claims to federal immunity from 
municipal oversight (Babe, 1990; Hogg, 1990). The important characteristics of those deliberations, however, related 
to interpretations of broader telecommunications sector oversight, as well as the abilities of municipalities to recoup 
costs from TSP activities within their jurisdictions (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2009). 
The prospect of municipalities provisioning broadband as a basic service would not only challenge the regu-
latory incumbency of the CRTC, but also serve as a litmus for the Commission’s framing of the public interest. 
A number of Canadian municipalities have successfully deployed broadband services of their own including, fibre 
deployment in Coquitlam, B.C. in 2008, gigabit service in Olds, Alberta in 2015, and gigabit service in Stratford, 
Ontario in 2016 (Christopher, 2017; Chung, 2013; Community Broadband Initiative, 2008; Khoo and Anderson, 
2015; Prkachin, 2016). In these cases, political willpower was emboldened by the dissatisfaction expressed from wit-
hin local public and business communities with the cost, selection, and reliability of incumbent broadband services. 
Pursuing a community level broadband undertaking was identified as a means of redressing these issues, while simul-
taneously supporting local economic interests by way of direct and indirect job creation (Christopher, 2017; Commu-
nity Broadband Initiative, 2008). While these initiatives constitute alternatives to the norm, they do illuminate the 
advantageous position of municipalities who pursue their own broadband service initiatives, as well as the net social 
and economic benefits for their constituencies. In terms of service delivery costs, municipal broadband situated under 
the umbrella of basic utilities can minimize capital costs by piggy-backing onto existing infrastructure while allowing 
the service to be managed on a not-for-profit basis. These examples, however, tend to be isolated to low priority retail 
broadband markets (Chung, 2013; Khoo and Anderson, 2015), or have been characterized by public Wi-Fi networks 
leased from TSPs (Middleton, 2009). As such, none have been met with any serious challenges from Canada’s incu-
mbent TSPs. What remains to be seen is the manner in which the CRTC would interpret TSP challenges to munici-
pal broadband activities in high priority service markets, and deployed under the statutory umbrella of basic services. 
Bridging the urban connectivity divide
Municipal policymakers have begun to envision the digitally networked environments of cities in terms of infrastruc-
tural qualities, distinct from a mobilizing economic logic that prioritizes the commercial affordances associated
with municipal broadband access (Middleton, 2015; Powell and Shade, 2006), and increasingly in terms of building 
more inclusive environments that bridge socio-economic gaps (City Clerk’s Office, 2015b, 2015a). While barriers to 
internet connectivity have traditionally been framed in terms of the rural-urban divide (Clement et al., 2004; Ra-
jabiun and McKelvey, 2019; Shepherd, 2018), increasing attention has been directed towards evidence of internet 
precarity in ostensibly ‘wired’ urban centres such as the City of Toronto (ACORN Canada, 2020; City Clerk’s Office, 
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2015a, 2015b). Although on-the-ground internet services are broadly diffused across the city, a combination of high 
retail service costs (Fontur International Inc. and MDB Insight Inc., 2017; Muzaffar, 2016) and quality levels that 
are incommensurate with the basic service targets announced by the CRTC in 2016 (Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission, 2016; Rajabiun and McKelvey, 2019), have made household internet accessibi-
lity elusive for some of Toronto’s most vulnerable populations (Media Relations Department, 2020; Teotonio and 
Rushowy, 2020).
Municipalities also constitute a level of governance that is highly accessible to constituents and characterized 
by collaboration between community organizations and elected officials in the delivery of essential public services. In 
this capacity, municipalities appear ideally situated to ensure targeted and stable broadband delivery to the residents 
that are most susceptible to the consequences of broadband disenfranchisement (Eubanks, 2007). Concrete examples 
of broadband disenfranchisement in otherwise highly connected urban centres can be found within low income and 
socially housed communities, a majority of which are comprised of families living on fixed and socially subsidized 
incomes (City Clerk’s Office, 2015b; Statistics Canada, 2017; Toronto Community Housing Corporation, 2016, 
2019). In these households, the abilities of individuals and families to maintain the daily routines that characterize 
their basic needs activities (housing maintenance, employment, education, healthcare and social inclusion), is further 
compromised by limited or unstable broadband access (Mikkonen and Raphael, 2010; The Affordable Access Coa-
lition, 2015).
Social and subsidized housing services represent a particularly viable option for municipal governments inte-
rested in ensuring broadband service delivery at the threshold identified in the CRTC’s 2016 decision. These facili-
ties, wholly owned and operated as not-for-profit undertakings within municipal service portfolios, provide essen-
tial housing services to the communities most likely to experience affordability constraints, and to devote a higher 
percentage of their household incomes to maintaining internet connectivity (Gonzales, 2015). If municipalities were 
to enfold broadband access as a basic service in their social and subsidized housing portfolios, municipal governments 
could help to bridge a significant affordability gap within low-income communities, while simultaneously alleviating 
a layer of stigmatization faced residents struggling to maintain essential broadband services (Eubanks, 2007; Federal 
Trade Commission, 2016). 
Barriers faced by municipalities
Though public policy at the municipal level is, typically, not as susceptible to the politicization that mediates policy at 
upper levels of government, empowering local governments would necessarily require the constructive facilitation of 
provinces and federal regulators; illuminating some of the primary obstacles to widespread delivery of broadband in-
ternet within the framework of municipal services. In the period between 2000 and 2011, the CRTC has consistently 
ruled in favour of incumbent TSPs on matters related to the deployment of TSP infrastructure in municipalities (Fe-
deration of Canadian Municipalities, 2009; The Strategic Counsel, 2010). In seven separate decisions between 2001 
and 2009, the CRTC exercised its powers under Section 43 of the Telecommunications Act to support applications 
made by incumbent TSPs to enter and occupy municipally governed thoroughfares and public spaces, and over the 
expressed objections of local authorities (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2009). Despite clear language in the 
act that prohibits such action without the consent of the affected municipality, the consistency with which the com-
mission has sided with TSPs has resulted in a regulatory state of affairs where incumbent TSPs are seen to exercise a 
“power to enter” by default  (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2009: 7). Given the underpinning commercial 
prerogatives that guide the deployment of TSP infrastructures, critics have framed this scenario as an example of the 
disconnect between federal telecommunications policy and the interests of local communities, wherein the power to 
protect public space for public interests is made subordinate to the commercial interests of regulated TSPs (Winseck, 
1995).
Extra jurisdictional tensions constitute another problematic barrier for municipalities whose statutory privileges 
are derived from the provinces. The reconfiguration of the City of Toronto’s electoral boundaries by a newly elected 
conservative government in Ontario have foregrounded the limited scope of self-determination afforded to muni-
cipalities (Mahoney, 2019; Tassonyi, 2017), and the impermanency of municipal autonomy given their subordinate 
status as “creatures of provinces” (Stoney and Waters, 2008). In a near complete reversal of the conciliatory provisions 
embodied by the City of Toronto Act (2006), the Progressive Conservative government under Premier Doug Ford 
withstood successive challenges made by the City of Toronto to the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives in uni-
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laterally reducing the size of Toronto City Council. Nominally proposed as an effort to reduce governing costs and 
diversify local representation, local authorities pointed out the implicit partisanship motivating the action as little 
more than an effort to disempower politically progressive voices on council (Boisvert, 2019).     
Pathways for municipalities 
Municipalities who wish to pursue broadband delivery undertakings of their own would require conciliatory arrange-
ments with provincial governments and federal regulators alike, primarily with a view to deferring challenges brought 
forward by incumbent TSPs. Should the CRTC prioritize a framing of the public interest independent of commercial 
prerogatives, and across the spectrum of matters brought to its attention, the Commission could both directly and 
indirectly empower local and regional governments to exercise community driven prerogatives (which may or may 
not privilege commercial interests) in the provisioning of broadband internet services.
Notable examples of Canadian municipalities who have pursued wholly public, not-for-profit broadband un-
dertakings include Campbell River and Coquitlam, British Columbia, Olds, Alberta, and Stratford, Ontario (Com-
munity Broadband Initiative, 2015, 2016). In addition to ensuring the availability of affordable broadband at service 
thresholds over and above those provisioned by incumbent TSPs, the public oversight implicated in these underta-
kings constitutes a critical layer of protection against misuse of user data, and for the entrenchment of net-neutrality 
independent of the oversight of incumbent TSPs in these matters at the federal level (Lord, 2018).
Despite examples of wholly public municipal broadband initiatives in Canada, this pathway is potentially 
fraught in larger, high value urban centres. Beyond the logistical complexity associated with deploying the necessary 
infrastructure, it is possible that municipalities instantiating themselves as carriers in these environments would result 
in regulatory challenges by incumbent TSPs who have a history of exploiting cabinet appeals to quell “competitive” 
undertakings (Mackwood, 2015; The Canadian Press, 2019).
Though lacking explicit statutory privilege in telecommunications undertakings, larger Canadian municipalities 
have the potential to leverage their capital assets and purchasing power to situate themselves as intermediaries in the 
provisioning of retail broadband services for vulnerable constituencies, and in relatively short order through their so-
cial and subsidized housing portfolios. Contingent on the political willpower to mobilize public resources, household 
internet services would thusly be enfolded into the base occupancy rent paid by subsidized residents commensurate 
to the rate for such services negotiated by the municipality. This approach is efficacious as a partial remedy to digital 
exclusion for two primary reasons. First, services provisioned under this model are the result of a financial transaction 
on the part of the municipality rather than a costly and time consuming network undertaking. Second, enfolding 
internet services into subsidized housing portfolios would extend statutory protections against service disconnection; 
ostensibly situating the internet as a non-excludable public service.
Telecommunications policymaking in Canada can be understood in terms of the subordinate/superordinate ar-
ranging of public and commercial values (Shepherd, 2018). And while no form of broadband policy can, on its own, 
remediate the underlying social and economic inequities embodied in Canada’s contemporary digital divide, we must 
nonetheless accept that the near total support the technology provides to the day-to-day functioning of contempo-
rary Canadian society has situated broadband access as a de-facto compulsory affordance that is necessary for active 
citizenship in the 21st Century. In policy terms, statutory provisions for non-excludable access to the internet could 
be realized by situating access to broadband service similar to that of universal healthcare or education, whereas uni-
versality is likely to be achieved by instantiating the technology alongside other “basic” utilities like water, electricity, 
or telephone. All of these services are facilitated, to varying degrees, at the municipal level, and commensurate to the 
unique needs of local constituents. Given the scope of basic and essential services provisioned by local governments, 
as well as the flexibility in revenue generation afforded to municipalities, situating broadband access within munici-
pal portfolios would not only empower local stakeholders with a direct interest in the issue, but also allow a level of 
oversight to take root that is far more responsive to community needs.
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